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Rumo ao fim da herança? A hipótese do ciclo de vida 
vendida aos idosos
Reflexões críticas sobre a tendência da hipoteca reversa
Anne Gotman*
Resumo: A hipoteca reversa, destinada a proprietários idosos conhecidos como “house 
rich, cash poor”, lhes dá a oportunidade de dispor do valor de suas casas sem ter 
que devolvê-lo durante a vida, a não ser que a moradia seja vendida ou desocupada 
pelo proprietário. Este tipo de empréstimo bancário visa reduzir despesas públicas 
com cuidados de longo prazo e manter o bem-estar das pessoas idosas e seus padrões 
de consumo. Inspirado pela hipótese do ciclo de vida, significa “comer a casa” para 
satisfazer suas necessidades, abandonando assim a idéia de transmissão. Este artigo 
discute a lenta decolagem do mercado das hipotecas reversas, a hipótese do ciclo 
de vida que fundamenta esses empréstimos e as políticas públicas que lhes regem, 
e também as conseqüências financeiras e materiais da compra para os proprietários 
idosos. Embora os relatórios de avaliação e estudos de caso destaquem as pressões que 
levam idosos ainda jovens a se engajarem numa “solução de último caso”, se quer saber 
se os titulares destas hipotecas realmente são, como os economistas gostariam, uma 
vanguarda em conformidade com as previsões da hipótese do ciclo de vida.
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Abstract: Reverse mortgages are designed for senior homeowners said to be “house 
rich, cash poor.” They allow for the extraction of equity from homes without payments 
being made until death or the house is sold. They are designed to alleviate public long-
term care expenses, as well as to maintain senior citizens’ well-being and consumption 
standards. Inspired by the life cycle hypothesis, they imply “eating the house” in order 
to meet one’s needs, as well as giving up the idea of bequest. This paper addresses the 
lengthy take-off of reverse mortgage markets, the life cycle theory sustaining reverse 
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mortgage policies, and the financial and material consequences of their purchase for 
aged homeowners. Whereas evaluation reports and case studies bring to light constraints 
already driving indebted younger elders to come to what appears to be a ‘last resort 
solution’, one may ask whether reverse mortgage buyers do represent a kind of avant-
garde conforming to the life cycle hypothesis requisites.
Keywords: reverse mortgage; life cycle hypothesis; bequest; seniors; old age policies
Introduction
Reverse mortgages are a very specific form of spending housing wealth 
which allows homeowners to borrow money by transferring ownership of the 
house to the bank. In Europe, they are used on a very limited scale, mainly 
in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, The Netherlands, Finland and 
France. They are also beginning to be used in the United States and Canada, 
as well as in Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Japan. Currently, taking 
out a mortgage for purposes other than buying a house is not a widespread 
phenomenon, “although it is growing in importance” (Housing Finance in the 
Euro Area, 2009). What is a reverse mortgage, how does it work and to what 
ends? Reverse mortgages rest on converting equity into cash. Their principle 
is simple: a homeowner mortgages a limited part of her house’s value, takes 
out benefits either in the form of monthly or term payments, or a line of credit, 
but instead of having to make monthly repayments to pay off the principle and 
the interests, she is authorized to pay off the whole debt at one time, when she 
dies or if she sells her house. Because lenders don’t want to wait too long to 
be paid back, reverse mortgages are exclusively offered to people of a certain 
age – from 60 to 62 or 65 years, depending on the country. Indeed, reverse 
mortgages are especially designed for ageing homeowners said to be “house 
rich, cash poor,” and who may want extra cash to meet their needs for their 
old days. 
In order to introduce the materiality of reverse mortgages for households, 
I shall refer to the storytelling used by operators in charge of the market. 
Here is the story of Angus and Lise published online by the Canadian Home 
Income Plan (CHIP) (www.chip.ca) to explain the opportunity to buy a reverse 
mortgage for a retired family whose cash is poor compared with their house 
value. 
Angus M. and Louise M. had enjoyed full and busy lives raising 
seven children in a small farming community outside of Ottawa. 
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close by and visited frequently. It would have saddened everyone 
if their parents had been forced to sell the family home. But that 
appeared to be the only option. They had limited income and were 
carrying an $85,000 mortgage along with $3,000 in credit card debt. 
They had approached the bank for a second mortgage but were turned 
down because they didn’t qualify. Then their financial advisor told 
them about a CHIP Home Income Plan. “It’s a wonderful product,” 
enthused Angus. “Our debts are now all paid off and we’re at ease. 
Without those monthly payments, we have the extra cash we need to 
do things and our income can now cover any surprise costs that we 
encounter. The best part is that I don’t have any stress.
Compared with forward mortgages, the peculiarity of reverse mortgages 
is striking: instead of being a “falling debt - rising equity” loan, it is on the 
contrary a “rising debt - falling equity” one. Reverse mortgage loans rest 
mainly upon two conditions: the borrower’s age and their house’s value; 
unlike classical mortgages, income is not taken into consideration. It means 
for instance that a 62-year-old American HECM (Housing Equity Conversion 
Mortgage) borrower is allowed to borrow up to 63% of the value of his house, 
while an 80-year-old can borrow up to 78% of it. The maximum equity that 
can be borrowed by a homeowner of such or such an age is determined by 
the risk of negative equity1. In addition to this relative maximum limit to be 
borrowed is also a fixed limit which for HECM loans amounted to 180 000 
dollars in 2006.
Reverse mortgages were launched in the eighties, and began to spread 
more significantly in the nineties. It is on the grounds of an already present 
increased longevity and the future growth of public expenses for elders’ care 
that reverse mortgages were considered as a solution to tackle the overwhelming 
cost of an ageing population. As they allow for the extraction of cash from 
walled equity (or “sleeping equity,” as French politicians say), the so-called 
“reverse mortgage loans” permit older homeowners to meet their expenses 
while staying at home. “No place like home”: the title of an American survey 
on reverse mortgages (Rodda et al., 2000), clearly shows what is at stake in 
their promotion. Instead of going into nursing homes, elderly homeowners can 
have proper care by “using [their] home to stay at home” (Stucki, 2005) - they 
will be able to afford it due to their loan’s proceeds. Thus, the cost of older age   
 
1  Negative equity happens when the final debt is higher than the value of the mortgaged property. 
If it is not insured, buyers (or their heirs) have to repay the total amount of their debt; on the 
contrary, when negative equity is insured, as it is now in almost every country, the buyer (or 
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should decrease for society as well as for individuals. This last assumption,   
linked directly with the so-called “life cycle hypothesis” from which reverse 
mortgages were inspired, will receive special attention here for its erasure 
of  the  possibility  of  heirs’  inheriting  anything  but  the  repayment  of  the   
house. 
As an object for sociology, the reverse mortgage issue is only starting to 
be explored. While economists began earlier to discuss the inputs and outputs 
of loans for banks, insurance companies and buyers, much sociological work 
has been driven by authorities in charge of experimental selling programs. 
These post-evaluation studies aim to bring together the supply and demand and 
therefore focus, first, on how adequate the plans are in terms of information, 
counselling, and variety of offers; and, second, with whom and to what ends 
they comply - or fail to do so. Supply strategies can also be documented 
through the work of academic advocates – the so to say “experts” - engaged in 
the promotion of reverse mortgages to professionals, keen to bring to the fore 
their potential pros and cons. Academic research on the subject is mainly to be 
found in general literature about housing wealth equity and its uses, of which 
reverse mortgages represent only a very small part. Only a few studies deal 
with the relation between reverse mortgages and inheritance issues, a subject 
we documented in France by the case study we directed through interviews and 
focus groups comprised of notaries whose attendance at the loan’s signature is 
mandated by law (Assier-Andrieu & Gotman, 2009). This paper will first turn 
to expectations in regard to reverse mortgages endorsed by public authorities 
and markets, including the life cycle hypothesis upon which these loans rely. 
The uses and users of reverse mortgages will then be examined as well as 
buyers’ constraints and motives in order to understand the rationales at work 
and to see how buyers actually deal with the issue of bequest. Before that, 
some information about the spread of reverse mortgages in the United States 
and some other countries will also be addressed.
The spread of reverse mortgages in the US and elsewhere
The first reverse mortgage loan to be offered in the United States by 
a private bank goes back to 1961. But its actual beginnings can be dated to 
the period between 1980 and 1989, when the federal HECM program was 
introduced. The HECM programme was given a major impulse by the National 
Council on Aging (NCOA), which duly contributed to the promotion of the 
idea of the reverse mortgage as a means of financing long-term care for seniors 
wishing to age at home, while the American Association of Retired Persons 
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such an altogether new and complex financial instrument. By 1989, after 
almost ten years of experiments and surveys, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) selected fifty lenders and launched the HECM 
Demonstration programme which was to become permanent eleven years 
later, in 1998. Today, HECM loans represent 90 per cent of the total number of 
reverse mortgages in the United States. The last estimation published in 2007 
cited 345,762 HECM originated loans. This number, lower than estimates 
launched  in  the  1990s,  which  projected  800,000  potential  customers,  is 
also much lower than a 2005 estimate which anticipated up to 13.2 million 
potential buyers (Redfoot et al., 2007). The same year, a more targeted survey 
estimated the potential HECM loan buyers population to reach 8.8 million 
(Merlis, 2005). Today, compared to the 30.8 million people aged 62 and 
over, the actual number of HECM loan detainees represents hardly one per 
cent. Indeed, a recent public evaluation of the Housing Equity Conversion 
Mortgages  programme  (HECM)  suggested  less  optimism  than  previous 
forecasters had thought; it suggested that reverse mortgages may serve more 
as a “niche product” than a “mainstream solution” (Redfoot et al., 2007). 
Reverse mortgages actually came in line with “alternative mortgages” and 
“creative financing” instruments, which did allow lenders to make loans 
with terms that obscured their total cost. Sold on secondary markets, they 
were also to fill the financial “bubble” and, as everyone is now aware, they 
put an end to Alan Greenspan’s dream of an everlasting real estate price   
increase. 
Meanwhile, the launching of reverse mortgages was slow in the United 
States as well as in other countries. Indeed, the markets were equally ignored by 
buyers and lenders alike whose associations repeatedly appealed to government 
support in order to propel the item forward. In Canada, where the Canadian 
Home Income Plan was created in 1986 in Vancouver, the gap between the 
advertised benefits of elderly homeownership as a “hidden wealth” and the 
targeted population whose budgets are unable to meet everyday life needs 
or unexpected expenses is significant. The Canadian Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation  (CMHC)  shows  a  highly  cautious  attitude  towards  reverse 
mortgages, and the market, still considered in its infancy (Report on Reverse 
Mortgages, 2006), covers only 2.5 per cent of the 68,000 house-rich and cash-
poor homeowners free of mortgages and considered as potential candidates. 
As the last report to the Parliament published on this subject in 2003 puts it: 
“Reverse mortgage has never gained wide acceptance in Canada” (Le Goff, 
2003). In Great Britain, “Equity release loans” represented only 0.5 per cent 
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of an average value of 40,000 pounds per household (Terry & Gibson, 2006). 
Here too, the costs appear to be a deterrent. For a lifetime mortgage whose 
annual interest rate is 7%, compounded every three months for instance, the 
debt doubles in the first ten years and doubles again in the following ten years. 
Moreover, the Equity Release schemes remain undermined by the devastating 
consequences of the lack of insurance against negative equity in the case of 
the first loans launched on the market. 
In New Zealand, a nation of homeowners, where 85% of elderly people 
are considered to have an appropriate income, the lasting tradition of house 
ownership and bequest accounts for the narrowness of the market. In Australia 
as well, reverse mortgages represent hardly 0.3% of home equity owned by 
homeowners aged 60 and over. Nevertheless, this still immature market could 
significantly expand, since the home equity value/average income ratio is 
twice as high as in the United States, for instance. Moreover, recent reports 
on the future intergenerational debt point out the appropriateness of such a 
solution regarding public health expenses for an ageing population (What Are 
the Health Challenges Facing Australia?, 2005). As for Japan, South Korea, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, reverse mortgage markets cannot be openly taken 
into consideration by governments because of the unclear roles of the State 
and the family towards old persons’ care. Nevertheless, unlocking equity 
plastered into the walls could be promoted to boost consumption and economic 
growth as a whole, as Japanese households leave an estate equal to twenty-five 
years of consumption, and real estate equal to twenty years of consumption 
(Mitchell and Piggott, 2003) – compared to 5 per cent in the United States, 
for instance. 
Should such a lengthy take-off be ascribed to people’s old-fashioned 
habits?, experts ask. To “overcome deeply held beliefs regarding the use of 
home equity among today’s old homeowners”, one should address educational 
guidance to the elderly, suggests Stucki (2005, p. 49). “Deeply held beliefs” 
to combat include: housing wealth not regarded as a fungible asset; a desire to 
leave a bequest; and, saving home equity as insurance for emergencies. Those 
beliefs, supposedly rooted in a fear of impoverishment embodied in the Great 
Depression experience, and ascribed to what is called the “depression era 
mentality”, are regarded as a generational phenomenon. In the United States 
as well as in other countries, obstacles to the extension of the reverse mortgage 
market are similarly ascribed to the current older generation’s way of life and 
its anchored frugality. Consequently, educational efforts are pointed towards 
younger generations, among whom consumption credit is assumed to be 
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Towards the redistribution of responsibilities between 
government and private citizens 
“With an estimated $2.1 trillion tied up in home equity, this financial 
asset has the potential to dramatically increase the ability of seniors to pay 
long-term care at home”, says an American reverse mortgage expert (Stucki, 
2004, p.2). As United States governors regularly point to the financial crisis 
of the Medicaid system for which states are responsible, and as the federally-
funded Medicare system is repeatedly said to be doomed to bankruptcy by 
Republican administrations, reverse mortgages appeared to many experts as 
a “bright spot.” Indeed, more than 80% of Americans aged 65 and over own 
their house. As the general trend for retirement and public health policies is 
getting less and less generous while a growing number of pensioners can be 
declared “house rich, cash poor”, it may reasonably be stated that the house 
should be used as a cash-tank to be tapped into for everyday life and old age 
needs. Indeed, the link between reverse mortgages and welfare scale back can 
be seen from their side-effects for American senior citizens whose federal 
social benefits may be reduced because of their loans’ proceeds. 
In Australia, the youngest of the OCDE countries nevertheless enjoying 
a high proportion of aged homeowners (82% of persons aged 65 and over), the 
first Home Equity Conversion loan to be launched in 1987 was subsidized by 
the Department of Social Security (Ong, 2008). But here, the highly politically-
risky pension issue prevented governments from putting reverse mortgages on 
the agenda and officially supporting reverse mortgage markets as they did in 
the United States. In the United Kingdom, where 70% of people aged 65 and 
over are homeowners, reverse mortgages are only one financial instrument 
amongst  others  –  including  the  Mortgage  Equity Withdrawal  (MEWs)  - 
designed to “bank on housing” (Smith, 2005) and boost consumption. The 
link between Equity Release schemes and old age care policies is apparent 
through means testing to which much social aid is subjected and which may 
lead reverse mortgages buyers to loose their benefits (Terry and Gibson, 2006). 
In France, where the so-called “prêt viager hypothécaire” (life-mortgage 
loan) was introduced in 2006 by executive order alongside revolving credits, 
reverse mortgages are bound to contribute to the general improvement of 
consumer credit instruments still at a relatively low level in comparison with 
other European countries. Here too, homeownership is high owing to the 
importance of the “second” home: 73% of French households with at least one 
retired member own their primary home, and 76% own at least one home. The 
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Nevertheless, national pro-family associations were quick to warn their fans 
against what they considered a potential threat for pension rights, and showed 
up with a sharp opposition to the principle of guaranteeing consumer credit on 
home property. Lenders were slow to participate, whereas notaries kept a “wait 
and see” position. Still, most were already convinced of their legitimacy, being 
assumed that public expenses could no longer continue to increase unless a 
state bankruptcy risk was accepted (Assier-Andrieu and Gotman, 2009). Time 
has come for citizens to be more ‘responsible’, they say. Just as responsibility 
was previously called upon to draw people into home ownership, it is now put 
forward to encourage them to tap into their equity. 
Politics on that matter may not be evenly explicit from one country 
to the other. But, despite rhetorical differences, reverse mortgages are to 
be understood in the new social division of work asking of governments 
to take charge of economic growth and of individuals to meet their own 
needs. Whereas they sustained strong homeownership policies, governments 
now duly agree with individual responsibility, “moral selves” and personal 
empowerment  mottos  in  order  to  promote  a  new  way  of  sharing  social 
costs. Where home equity represents the largest component of household 
assets and where pensions as well as health policies are scaled back in line 
with international treaties and agreements, housing wealth should sustain 
citizenship in a new way. In accordance with international forums appealing 
for new institutional arrangements (Howe and Healy, 2005), it is expected 
that responsibilities should be redistributed between governments, voluntary 
associations and private citizens. More specifically, pensions and long-term 
care for the ageing population, considered a “risk,” should be fuelled both by 
intra- and intergenerational transfers. Eventually, reverse mortgages activate 
intergenerational transfers in two ways, for they are to be used not only by 
seniors for their own sake at the expense of children’s inheritance, but also to 
help needy adult heirs-not-to-be. 
The theoretical ground for reverse mortgages: 
the life cycle hypothesis 
“According to the ‘life cycle hypothesis’ of savings and consumption, 
says the 2007 HECM evaluation report in its introduction, one would predict 
that individuals would pay down debts and build savings in their working 
years, then diverse those savings to support consumption in their old years” 
(Redfoot et al., 2007, p. v). The life cycle hypothesis quoted by the HECM 
evaluation report is a theoretical model of consumption which aims to draw 
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curve. Early attempts to establish a link between the consumption plans of an 
individual, her income and income expectations from childhood, through the 
work participation years, into retirement and eventual death – i.e. during the 
life cycle –, appeared during the Roosevelt New Deal era, when consumption 
was put at the forefront of Keynesian economic concerns. Nevertheless, the life 
cycle hypothesis’ full paternity is granted to the Nobel prize winner Modigliani 
who, along with Brumberg, sharply defined the “hypothesis” on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds. The key statement of the life cycle hypothesis was the 
specification that the life-time utility function be homothetic – this permitted 
planned consumption for each period to be written as a function of expected 
wealth as seen as the planning date, the functional parameters being in no way 
dependant on wealth but upon age and tastes. Sharpening their hypothesis 
further on, the authors specified than an individual would plan to consume the 
same amount in real discounted terms each year. Regarding the hypothesis, 
the assets accumulation curve has a humpback shape whose maximum takes 
place just before retirement, and decreases from then until death. Throughout 
that process, desire for bequest and initial assets were set to zero. However, the 
authors did show that bequests could be accounted for within the homothetic 
utility function itself if that became necessary. That accumulation does not 
equal zero at death is due to the impossibility to predict the exact time of 
one’s death. This model assumes that consumption is the only so to say 
“egoistic” individuals’ horizon; that it is exclusively shaped by age and taste; 
and that accumulation simply meets the desire to transfer purchasing power 
in time. 
One can easily see how reverse mortgages comply with the life cycle 
hypothesis, while at the same time it clears the path for self-welfare. Retired 
people are deemed and indeed invited to “tap into their equity” and to “unlock 
the savings stored in the house” in order to support themselves in their old age. 
If properly foreseen, the reverse mortgage should lead to home equity being 
consumed. Nevertheless, as reverse mortgage markets do not come up so far 
to actuaries’ great expectations, their supporters are intrigued by the patterns 
of asset decumulation in retirement: “One intriguing finding, says one, is that 
seniors typically do not draw down their housing equity wealth to support 
general non-housing consumption needs” (Stucki, 2004, p.8). Instead, home 
ownership continues to be high in old age, while home equity does not appear 
to fall with age either, as Venti and Wise (2001) confirmed after having taken 
a second look at their own results. From 1989 to 1999, home equity among 
American seniors had risen by almost 7% over the last decades whereas the 
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In other words, the resilience of retired persons to unlock their savings 
from their house is already an interpretation in terms of consumers’ attitudes. 
People’s ability to assess the risks of age is already assessing that old age is 
a risk, and has to be thought primarily in that way. On the contrary, it seems 
that lay people think of their old age in terms of a safety net and security, and 
that home equity is their best insurance. Only hasty shocks, like a spouse’s 
death or a spouse entering a nursing home, can lead elderly people to liquidate 
their equity, say Venti and Wise. Elderly retired persons do continue to keep 
their savings; they even increase their asset levels when selling a house. Thus, 
Venti and Wise maintain that elderly retired persons’ financial choices are 
inconsistent with “a substantial interest for these products [reverse mortgages]” 
(Venti and Wise, 2001, p.4). This may be the reason why, more than because of 
technicalities, a lack of demand could explain the reluctance towards reverse 
mortgages as well as their failure. Therefore, the next question is: what can be 
inferred about demand, from empirical surveys on reverse mortgage buyers? 
What pushed them to dissave in later life? Do they represent the enlightened 
minority ready to eat their house at the expense of bequeathing it to their 
offspring? And do they represent the future end of the bequest motive erased 
by the life cycle hypothesis? 
Reverse mortgages’ performances for households
What do reverse mortgages actually bring to their buyers? May reverse 
mortgages buyers be regarded as the elderly avant-garde? And if so, in what 
way? From evaluation reports and academic research carried out on the 
subject, results appear contradictory at first glance, except for one thing: the 
high cost of reverse mortgage loans. First, reverse mortgage costs are very 
high because buyers are accountable for the principle and for the accrued value 
of the interests - making the estimation of interests in the long run a rather 
complicated matter for lay persons who are the bulk of reverse mortgage clients. 
The mandatory counselling sessions designed by the HECM programme to 
help clients’ decisions do not mention the total cost of the debt, for example, 
one year, five years or ten years after the purchase (Scholen and Belling, 
2006). This lack of revelation is one reason why we have called it the “silent 
debt” (Assier-Andrieu and Gotman, 2009). Second, interest may be fixed 
interests but more and more often they are adjustable interest rates, making 
the amount of debt all the more difficult to appreciate again for lay persons. 
Third, the upfront costs are also high for they encompass origination fees and 
a mandatory mortgage insurance premium. Finally, loan’s cost depend on the 
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credit lines - the more commonly used - and combinations of both). In addition 
to these costs, the borrower must properly maintain his house in order to keep 
its marketable value at the initial level. Annual inspections ensure that. The 
high level of reverse mortgage costs is considered everywhere as the first 
reason for their unpopularity. Reverse mortgages are indeed one of the most 
expensive loans whereas, as must be recalled, they are designed for less well-
off homeowners. They may go up to 30% of interest. Furthermore, reverse 
mortgages are all the more expensive as they serve small payments2. This 
may highlight why some people tend to say: “After a short while, you realize 
you are in deeper than you thought you’d be” (Rodda et al., 2000, p. 89). But, 
apart from financial consequences, there are residential consequences too. This 
story, issued by a Canadian survey (Report on Reverse Mortgages, 2006), tells 
how the reverse mortgage can jeopardise the very old years spent in a home 
it was supposed to secure. 
Mr. A and Mrs. A are a married couple. Both of them are 68 years 
old; both retired at age 65. Mr. A’s and Mrs. A’s pensions provide 
them with a modest income. Their savings are minimal. Mr. A and 
Mrs. A own a house that was built in the 1920s and is located in a 
working-class neighbourhood. Apart from the house and a 10-year-
old car, Mr. A and Mrs. A own no major assets. The house has risen 
considerably in value since Mr. A and Mrs. A purchased it. It is 
currently valued at $300 000. In fact, the house is in need of repair. 
Its condition is becoming a source of anxiety for Mr. A and Mrs. A.
Mr. A and Mrs. A have always dreamed about travelling across North 
America in a recreational vehicle. They hoped to spend their early 
retirement fulfilling this dream. But their current income will not 
permit them to do it. They decide to borrow the money they need 
to fulfil their goals. They find the choices to be baffling, as neither 
has much experience in evaluating financial products. They become 
attracted to a product called a “reverse mortgage,” because it is a 
product that is only available to senior citizens, it is a loan geared 
to the value of their house rather than their level of income, and it 
does not require them to make periodic payments. They complete the 
application procedure for the reverse mortgage, which includes an 
appraisal of their house. Mr. A and Mrs. A are told that they are eligible 
to borrow $80 000, with interest at an annual rate of 7.25 percent, 
compounded semi-annually. They agree to borrow that amount.
2  Had a 74-year-old HECM buyer, for instance, borrowed, by 2006, only half of the maximum 
amount allowed (which was up to 180 000 dollars at that time) and taken a lump sum without 
borrowing anything after, he would owe 150 000 dollars twelve years after that. During the same 
period, if the value of his house increased by 4 per cent a year, the cost of the loan would equal 
31% of its value. At the same time, he would have half of his house left. (Redfoot et al., 2007).104  Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 11, n. 1, p. 93-114, jan.-abr. 2011
Mr. A and Mrs. A use $25 000 from the proceeds of the reverse 
mortgage to purchase a used recreational vehicle. They also use 
$5000 to begin making repairs to their house. They invest the 
remaining $50000 in an annuity, which gives them approximately 
$325  per  month  in  income.  The  payments  from  this  annuity 
supplement their pension income and enable them to travel.
Ten years after they enter into the reverse mortgage, Mr. A and 
Mrs. A, now 78, decide that they wish to move. They have found 
it difficult to keep their home in proper repair and wish to move to 
a smaller, more manageable property. They are informed that the 
reverse mortgage will come due when they complete the sale of their 
house. They are also informed that they owe slightly more than $160 
000, or double the amount that they borrowed. This surprises Mr. 
A and Mrs. A. Their home has not appreciated greatly in value. Mr. 
A and Mrs. A are not sure that the amount they will receive from its 
sale will enable them to purchase the property they want, after the 
reverse mortgage has been paid off. 
Whereas reverse mortgage costs are unanimously attested, and long-term 
dangers cautiously mentioned by evaluators, satisfactory indexes may at first 
appear contradictory. Here, the formulation of the questions is at stake, but 
the moment of inquiry is critical as well: was it at the beginning of the loan, 
after a few years, or later? From the first representative survey on HECM 
clients launched in 2007, for instance, it appears that a vast majority of buyers 
were satisfied with their choice: 58% declared themselves to be completely 
satisfied, 25% answered mostly satisfied and 12% partly satisfied (Redfoot et 
al., 2007). Yet, the authors cautiously pointed out that 92% of the sample had 
been interviewed at most three years after their purchase. Therefore, these 
figures only reflected “their short-term assessments.” Over time, as they review 
the substantial growth in their reverse mortgage debt, current borrowers “may 
become more keenly aware of how much of their equity has been consumed 
by loan fees and interest” (ibid., p. 104). 
A previous HECM evaluation had shown that motives for such a choice 
were mainly three: buyers wished to stay at home, to have an “extra cushion”, 
and to stay independent while keeping the quality of life they were used to. 
“It made the difference between living and just existing”, some said. Others 
were happy to be free of continuous worries and enjoyed “feeling pretty 
comfortable” (Rodda et al., 2000). That’s also what Leviton’s research brought 
to the fore in interviews with Massachusetts reverse mortgage programme 
clients, although with a less enthusiastic tone. Here, interviewed widowers 
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up in the house”, acknowledged that the loan was their only way to avoid 
moving from their familiar neighbourhood and being cut from their family 
ties, while being able to stay at home “free and clear” (Leviton, 2001). The 
very low income households for whom the programme was designed were 
adamant to have “a clear head for the rest of their life” and to keep control 
on a frugal way of life that could be jeopardized by any unexpected expense 
– for them a car repair could be a “real blow.” Therefore, the first benefit 
of the reverse mortgage was “to keep up with their bills” in the same way 
as before, i.e. without credit. On the other hand, inquiries conveyed in the 
United Kingdom (Davey, 1997) and in New Zealand (Davey and Wilton, 2006) 
show a high degree of satisfaction amongst more well-off buyers who mainly 
enjoyed having liquidities and being independent from youngsters they were 
even able to visit overseas. The only reason for feeling insecure mentioned 
by respondents was not so much their own financial situation as the lenders’ 
reliability in the long run.
Under satisfaction indicators, the actual uses of reverse mortgages 
offer a somehow different picture of reasons buyers are buying and seeking 
profits. If asked about the reasons why they made this choice, the HECM 
survey  respondents  declare,  in  decreasing  order:  “emergencies”,  “the 
unexpected”, “everyday expenses”, “improved quality of life”, “home repairs/
improvements”, “pay off mortgage debts”, “property taxes/insurance”, “pay 
off non-mortgage debts”, and only then “health or disability” (Redfoot et al., 
2007). Asked now about the first reason why they bought a reverse mortgage, 
the same respondents quote, first: “pay off mortgage debt.” When finally 
asked what was the first use of the reverse mortgage proceeds, the first item 
quoted was “pay off non mortgage debt” (27% of respondents), then “home 
repairs/improvement”, and “improved quality of life” (18% each), “everyday 
expenses” (17%), “emergencies/the unexpected” (10%), “health or disability” 
(9%), and “property taxes/insurance” (5%) (ibid.) In other words, improvement 
of quality of life comes first only for 18% of the respondents, whereas all other 
uses which may be summed up as a means to stay at home come to 82%. As 
the authors conclude, “reverse mortgage borrowers are not using their loans 
as a basic income supplement, at least not in a straightforward way.” Contrary 
to previous predictions, buyers “clearly use their loan proceeds primarily to 
retire debts and pay for upfront expenses” (Redfoot et al., 2007). As confessed 
by some respondents, reverse mortgage was indeed a “last resort option.” 
French notaries, faced with the same kind of demands, appeared somewhat 
worried: “There are people who want to make a prêt viager hypothécaire to 
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as I’m concerned, this is never a good sign. It makes me worried. Not that I 
think they are impecunious. But they are a little bit enthusiastic about it.” “It 
may be a very good instrument”, warns another, “but unless they win on the 
lottery, I do not see how they will be able to pay back, unless they sell the 
house of course. But with such an interest rate, the selling price will never 
pay the debt. One should be realistic. Heirs won’t be able to pay back the 
debt, and as a consequence the house will be the banker’s property. It can’t 
end otherwise” (Assier-Andrieu & Gotman, 2009, p.198). Years earlier, Venti 
and Wise (1991) had already come to the same conclusion. They found that 
median income older homeowners would only extract from reverse mortgages 
a reduced increase of their income.    
In the United Kingdom as well as in New Zealand, where home repairs 
or improvement comes first, conditions for reverse mortgage buyers do not 
seem so precarious. Still, paying off debt comes at the second rank of actual 
uses of equity release loans, including bills and mortgage debt in New Zealand, 
whereas in the United Kingdom, the second item to be quoted was health and 
care. Besides, while people were keen to stay independent from their offspring 
– a repeated statement abundantly used by reverse mortgage advocates -, they 
could sometimes buy a reverse mortgage to help an heir-not-to-be whose 
business was faltering, to save their home and pay for their forward mortgage. 
Helping offspring too is a praised benefit duly advertised by reverse mortgage 
lenders. 
In the US, another two indicators suggest that reverse mortgages are 
mainly used to meet difficulties rather than to improve quality of life, or to “live 
life to the full” as an Australian website for seniors puts it: first is the decline 
of the tenure payment option (chosen by 47% of buyers by 1991 but only 19% 
by 2005); second is the increasingly younger age of buyers (Redfoot et al. 
2007). The same survey emphasises the growing number of people coming up 
to retirement with a substantial debt, and, amongst people still free of debt at 
this stage, their increasing debt rate. Similarly, the Australian Senate Report 
highlights that older people appear to be taking greater debt into retirement 
than was previously the case (A Decent Quality of Life, 2008). Going further, 
a Canadian report on reverse mortgages links up their development to the 
increasing level of debt among aged people (Report on Reverse Mortgages, 
2006). 
Whereas  reverse  mortgages  may  pay  off  a  forward  mortgage  (this 
payment is currently mandatory for HECM loan buyers), ownership may 
become a lifelong mortgaged property. Moreover, when people buy a reverse 
mortgage to get “free” of debt, they get in fact another highly expensive    A. Gotman – Towards the end of bequest? The life cycle hypothesis ...  107
debt, but a silent one, which won’t have to be paid back, or else by the heirs. 
Therefore, if reverse mortgage buyers may be qualified as an avant-garde 
population, it is because they experience a reversing trend of the post World 
War II old age financial wealth and security where savings embodied in house 
ownership could encompass old age security needs and a wish to bequest all 
together, instead of being converted into credit for consumption. In this way, 
they would be the first to behave according to the life cycle hypothesis. To 
French notaries, the link between reverse mortgages and consumption policies 
was clear: reverse mortgages are good for consumption policies, whether they 
are so for people or not. “On paper, it looks okay. One can help people, but 
in fact the legislator’s profound idea is to allow people to consume more by 
mortgaging their property”, says one. “The prêt viager hypothécaire is made 
to consume better or to face a blow but still, it is a result of consumption”, 
says another. Such an orientation was of real concern to some: “Somewhere I 
consider it has something of the nature of impoverishment. I am not sure it goes 
in the right direction, but it goes in the direction of favouring consumption.” 
Another notary goes further: “Do borrow to get more resources and consume 
more. Get poorer! On the macro-economic level, it is easy to understand, an 
amassed stock won’t make the economy go around. Only consumption can do 
it” (Assier-Andrieu and Gotman, 2009, p.199-200).
How reverse mortgage buyers deal with their wish to bequest
In Australia,  where  death  duties  have  been  abolished  and  bequest 
is sanctified, polls have shown that the inheritance issue could be a major 
obstacle to reverse mortgage development (Dolan et al. 2005). Similarly, in 
Canada, the Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan (Reverse Mortgages, 
2006) displays its concern about the “most obvious drawback of the reverse 
mortgage” which “depletes the homeowner’s equity” and reduces “the value 
of the estate that can be left to heirs.” Yet, as already mentioned, reverse 
mortgage supporters do favour lifetime downward transfers and inter vivos 
gifts. They argue for the borrowers’ ability to help their children with loan 
proceeds, acknowledging the growing need of intergenerational support across 
the family. But whereas this invitation to draw house equity down to help 
children is a special token for poorer families, low income homeowners are 
the very same who tend to be the most reluctant towards reverse mortgages. 
The British asset-rich, income-poor pensioners interviewed by Maxwell and 
Sodha (2006, p. 55-56) felt that “they had spent their working lives saving their 
home.” Therefore, “it was not a resource they were prepared to tap into their 
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years of hard graft to get where I am and no one can take that away.” Among 
the factors shaping similar negative attitudes, say Maxwell and Sodha, “the 
desire to leave a bequest is critical. The implications of equity release for the 
inheritance they were able to leave to their children and grandchildren made it 
extremely unattractive.” “It’s robbing the heirs”, says one. “The home is all we 
have to pass on”, says another. “Children come first”, he adds. “If you had no 
family ties, it’d be great”, others say. Here, as in France, the United States, and 
elsewhere, regardless of whether their histories and reasons differ, ownership 
has deep symbolic importance. Planning its lifetime consumption would “be 
going backwards”, one interviewee said. Similarly, Gibler and Rabianski 
(2006), studying American elderly interest in reverse mortgage, maintain that 
the two main hindrances to reverse mortgage acceptance are willingness to 
keep ownership free from mortgage and willingness to bequeath. Both HECM 
evaluations had come to highlight the conflict between the bequeathing faculty, 
regarded as a “responsibility” even among people without children, and the 
reverse mortgage principle. They outlined the bequest issue as being “crucial.” 
Leviton (2001) too concluded from her inquiry that the wish to bequeath as it 
is currently observed leaves the reverse mortgage market with a limited span, 
that of a niche product. 
Children’s approval of parents’ decision to buy a reverse mortgage is 
usually considered as a major proof of the fall of the inheritance rationale. In 
most cases, borrowers’ children had been informed of their parents’ plan and 
most often they did agree with it, when not pushing them to go into it. A New 
Zealand survey holds that 90% of borrowers’ children approved their parents’ 
decision to buy an equity release loan. In this respect, children’s approval 
of parents’ reverse mortgage purchases fits perfectly with the current rule of 
generational autonomy. They want to see their parents out of trouble, even at 
the expense of a future inheritance, especially if they happen to be better off 
themselves. Yet, this percentage came down to 63 amongst respondents who 
finally decided not to buy such loans (Davey & Wilton, 1997). Indeed, behind 
what appears at first glance like consensus and the children’s willingness to 
give up their future inheritance, interviewed parents voiced a slightly different 
mood. Some felt that it was similar to a “handhout or something you should 
be ashamed of” and were embarrassed to tell their children (Rodda et al., 
2000). The New Zealand survey voices a wider sort of embarrassment directed 
towards the social milieu. Borrowers confessed their reluctance to speak about 
something said not to be “socially approved.” They also confessed that such 
a solution betrays management and financial failure (Davey & Wilton, 2006). 
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for  new  dependency  to  these  markets’  financial  products  is  taking  over 
from a dependency to renting markets that homeownership was supposed to 
overcome.
French notaries’ opinions about the future of transmission and reverse 
mortgages are those of financial managers the profession longs more and more 
to aspire to. Yet, some confess their doubts in regard to the end of bequest. 
Therefore they don’t foresee how reverse mortgages could be a success. 
“French people are keen to be able to transmit stock to their children; this is 
the reason why the prêt viager hypothécaire does not work today. I am not 
sure it will be a success, because the prêt viager hypothécaire leads to leaving 
nothing to the children. One shall leave a stock eaten by debt”, says one. Some 
stress the human need of bequeathing: “Inheritance had good sides. It brings 
heirs together at least for a moment. It is the last remaining thing. One wants 
to extend one’s personality through what is left to others. I think the human 
being is necessarily attached to it.” Yet, like reverse mortgage supporters, other 
notaries ascribe the will to bequeath to historic generational attitudes. Pre-
war generations are keen to pass on their stock, but will their grand-children 
behave in the same way? “Pre-war generations want to transmit, whatever it is, 
a flat or a country house. People are keen to find their roots again, so they want 
to transmit. Maybe our children will be tied to it in the same way, but what 
about our grand-children and our great-grand-children? They may change 
completely…” Changes may occur, says another, and a new philosophy may 
replace the old one: “People have got this idea of transmission. Maybe this is 
going to change, maybe we shall get to this new philosophy, I am not absolutely 
convinced of that, but who knows?” Other notaries wish for these changes to 
come, and do appeal in their favour. Some of them welcome the prêts viagers 
hypothécaires as an Anglo-Saxon technique that should push French society 
to evolve and get “colder” attitudes towards property. As this notary clearly 
states, property should be eaten: “I think this is excellent. I think society 
has not developed enough. This is somehow an Anglo-Saxon technicality. 
Regarding patrimony, this technicality is rather cold minded, and a property 
manager cannot have feelings towards property. He should take it as a token 
or as a thing. Figure a daily ordinary need no one can fulfil, there is money 
aside, so you mobilise it in advance, provided with certainty that the house 
will eventually be sold in order to pay. So far comes the response to immediate 
needs. So I am totally convinced, my conviction is that this institution must 
supersede current mores and customs. I stand for a patrimony to be eaten, not 
squandered.” For others, financial trends are at stake. They suggest behaving 
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Like people, it has now several lives. Wouldn’t it be better to sell one’s house 
progressively before dying than leaving it closed, ruined, then sold?” Yet, 
the same notaries admit the dark face of reverse mortgages: “Sure, they will 
postpone the burden of debt and impoverish forthcoming generations” (Assier-
Andrieu and Gotman, 2009, p.201-203). 
Are “Anglo-Saxon” mores and customs different from continental ones, 
as suggested by the above comment? Are some countries enjoying stronger 
social policies and other welfare states more adverse to banking on housing as 
well as to tapping into house equity? Is housing wealth not to be considered 
anymore for inheritance? British social research on inheritance in the United 
Kingdom has identified a “shift (albeit uneven) away from the idea that housing 
wealth is primarily a legacy for future generations towards the notion that it 
is a resource to spend across the life course”, Smith et al. assert. “In line with 
other studies, just two in five Boh [banking on housing] participants expect 
to leave their housing wealth for inheritance; most plan to spend some (36%) 
or all (20%) of it before they die, either on high days and holidays, or to meet 
a more sobering array of welfare needs” (Smith et al., 2009, p.89). Yet, if 
there are “just two in five” people expecting to leave their housing wealth 
for inheritance, there are two in five plus 36% of people – making 76% – 
expecting to leave some housing wealth for inheritance. Housing wealth may 
no longer be primarily a legacy for future generations, but still, most people 
express the wish to leave something.
Conclusion: The dispute surrounding bequest motives and 
its outlines
What can be concluded from these empirical data about the motive to 
bequest? As shown by our enquiry on inheritance, younger generations do 
maintain that their parents’ good life can be the best memory and gift to be 
passed on (Gotman, 1988). The offspring sincerely urge their parents to live 
their later life to the full as well as to free themselves from obligations at least 
for now. As they advocate for reciprocal independence, they free themselves 
from having to bother for their ageing parents too. May it be inferred, though, 
that parents and adult children do conform to the life cycle hypothesis standards 
about “bequest motives” – a matter duly screened, whose results appear 
delusive?3 When, instead of questioning bequeathing motives, questions are   
 
3  in Skinner’s view, “the debate about motives is ‘a non-debate”, since saving for bequests and 
precautionary saving are not substitutes, but could well be complements, in accordance with 
a combination of motives which probably explain wealth accumulation in the 17th century, in 
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focused on the problem of receiving an inheritance, it appears that the core 
motive to bequeath is to bequeath again – if not what has been received but the 
very fact of being a receiver (Gotman, 2006). Because the design to bequeath 
becomes real and considered only after one becomes oneself an heir, and 
bequeathing is anchored in the experience of inheritance, asking in abstract 
terms about bequest motives may not be relevant. Aside from that, questioning 
the intention to bequeath today does not fit with a society where transmission 
relationships are no longer constrained but, like marriage, freely agreed. 
Inheritance does not make social status anymore. Likewise, there is no straight 
obligation to support ascendants. Each generation enjoys its autonomy with its 
own incomes and savings, making a declarative intention to bequeath all the 
more unlikely. Passing on comes out more as a possibility than an intention, 
or eventually a wish, not openly expressed, for it is adverse to individual 
autonomy. Reciprocally, inheritance is no longer an “expectation” and not a 
subject to be openly touched upon by adult children. That is why potential 
receivers dare even less than their counterparts (potential bequeathers) to 
declare themselves as such. To not speak about inheritance has become the 
normative expression of present succession relationships. Today, this last 
reason may perfectly account for silent transmission attitudes, not speaking 
out of a repulsion to think about death. Bequest should not be spoken of and 
waiting for inheritance even less, yet, intergenerational transfers do increase at 
the same time as household wealth does. They may increase even more due to 
the growing feeling that children now will not manage as well as their parents 
did in their time. The feeling of accrued precariousness, the fear that children 
are to face more economic difficulties, and that their family life will be more 
vulnerable may explain why the same young respondents who declared not to 
be waiting for any inheritance maintain that they do wish to leave a bequest. 
Besides, it appears from French notary records that divorced parents are 
more quick and eager to make a will than their non divorced counterparts. 
Bequest practices among divorced people are many, depending mainly on 
the time of the divorce. If it is an early divorce, first-marriage children are 
poorly provided for. If it is on the contrary a later divorce, they will be much 
more generously provided for. Like family itself, inheritance patterns move 
along with changing mores and manners. That is the way they resist most of 
them.
It may also be noted that if reverse mortgages are to be especially relevant 
for low income homeowners, inequalities in the propensity to bequeath will 
increase too. At present, bequeathing inequality follows transmitters’ incomes. 
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reciprocally, people with the lowest incomes pass on the lowest bequests 
(Rowlingston and McKay, 2005; Laferrère, 1990). Bequest inequalities also 
go the other way, as they are more surprisingly related to receivers’ incomes 
as well. The less the receiver’s income, the less her inheritance. There is no 
compensation between social and cultural inheritance on the one hand, and 
material inheritance on the other. Both work hand in hand. Reducing the 
propensity to bequeath among those with lower incomes will not only increase 
inequalities between older generations’ capacity to bequeath, but also between 
members of the inheriting generation.
While depleting bequests and inheritances, reverse mortgages enforce 
the normative economic statement of the house as a consumption good. States’ 
high levels of debt as well as growth mottos make low and middle-class 
decumulation processes seen as an inescapable trend. The life cycle hypothesis 
of which reverse mortgages are a straight application implies that elderly 
security savings should be drawn down from home ownership and bequest 
practices given up. The question here is whether this model fits with people’s 
actual uses and wishes. To that, we may answer that reverse mortgages buyers 
do not agree with the life cycle hypothesis requisites. For attitudes towards 
bequest did not fall into abeyance. Indeed, one should consider a society where 
the home, no longer the place of social and family aggregation, reduced to its 
market value and dematerialized in the same way as money, would be vowed 
to be an insurance product. One should finally consider a society which would 
have done away with the very idea of transmission. In that respect, the so 
called “reverse” mortgages would indeed accomplish a profound reversion of 
the anthropological sense of home.
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